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Abstract
In this paper, we consider an exchange economy a la Shitovitz
(1973), with atoms and an atomless set. We associate with it a strate-
gic market game of the kind rst proposed by Lloyd S. Shapley, known
as the Shapley window model. We analyze the relationship between
the set of the Cournot-Nash allocations of the strategic market game
and the Walras allocations of the exchange economy with which it is
associated. We show, with an example, that even when atoms are
countably innite, any Cournot-Nash allocation of the game is not a
Walras allocation of the underlying exchange economy. Accordingly, in
the original spirit of Cournot (1838), we partially replicate the mixed
exchange economy by increasing the number of atoms, without aect-
ing the atomless part, and ensuring that the measure space of agents
remains nite. Our main theorem shows that any sequence of Cournot-
Nash allocations of the strategic market games associated with the
partial replications of the exchange economy has a limit point for each
trader and that the assignment determined by these limit points is a
Walrasian allocation of the original economy.
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1 Introduction
A large literature has been developed in the past decades, aiming at ex-
tending to a general equilibrium framework the classical Cournot's theory
of oligopoly (see Cournot (1838)), where oligopolistic agents that interact
noncooperatively among themselves face a sector of consumers taking prices
as given. Most of the contributions on this issue belongs to two main lines
of research: the Cournot-Walras equilibrium approach, initiated by Gab-
szewicz and Vial (1972), and the strategic market game approach, initiated
by Shapley and Shubik (1977).
In their 1972's paper, Gabszewicz and Vial transposed to a general equi-
librium setting Cournot's original idea of an asymmetric economy with pro-
duction, in which rms with oligopolistic power that interact strategically
on quantities face a sector of consumers behaving a la Walras. Nevertheless,
in the same paper, they pointed out two major diculties inherent in the
standard Cournotian approach with strategic rms: rst, prot maximiza-
tion may not be a rational objective for rms that have inuence on prices;
second, the equilibrium is not independent from the rule chosen to normal-
ize prices. These diculties have been overcome within the Cournot-Walras
approach by moving to the analysis of pure exchange economies (see Codog-
nato and Gabszewicz (1993), d'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira, and Gerard-
Varet (1997), Gabszewicz and Michel (1997), Shitovitz (1997), among oth-
ers). However, this latter class of models do not avoid a well-known problem
inherent in the Cournot-Walras approach: there, an equilibrium may not ex-
ist, even in mixed strategies, since the Walras price correspondence may fail
to admit a continuous selection (see Dierker and Grodal (1986)). A further
fundamental problem common to the whole Cournot-Walras approach is
that it leaves unexplained why some agents behave strategically while other
agents behave competitively.
A dierent approach has been developed (still in pure exchange), that
uses strategic market games a la Shapley and Shubik with the aim at provid-
ing a formal explanation of perfectly and imperfectly competitive behavior.
A fundamental contribution in this line is the paper of Okuno, Postlewaite
and Roberts (1980). In particular, since the work of these authors, results
in this direction have been obtained by incorporating within the framework
of strategic market games a mixed measure space of traders a la Shitovitz
(1973), composed by large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders,
represented by an atomless part. In this setting, while all agents have a
priori the same strategic position, some of them turn out to have inuence
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on prices and some other turn out to be Walrasian, depending on their char-
acteristics and their weight in the economy. Then, the asymmetric structure
typical of the Cournotian theory is endogenously generated.
Busetto, Codognato, and Ghosal (2011) obtained a generalization of
Okuno et al.'s work by using a mixed version of the Cournot-Nash equi-
librium model rst proposed by Lloyd S. Shapley, and known as the Shapley
window model (this model was analyzed, in the case of nite economies,
by Sahi and Yao (1989)). Busetto et al. (2011) provided an endogenous
explanation of oligopolistic and competitive behavior. Moreover, working
within this strategic market game framework permitted them to show the
existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies, and then to overcome the
non-continuity problem which characterizes the Cournot-Walras approach.
This paper studies the link between Cournot and Walras equilibrium,
with the aim of providing a noncooperative foundation to the theory of
perfect competition. A mixed exchange economy a la Shitovitz is associated
with the same strategic market game a la Shapley proposed by Busetto
et al. (2011). Within this framework, the relationship between the set of
the Cournot-Nash allocations of the strategic market game and the Walras
allocations of the underlying exchange economy is examined. We show, with
an example, that even when the set of atoms is countably innite, there
is the robust possibility that no Cournot-Nash allocation of the strategic
market game is a Walras allocation of the underlying exchange economy,
because some atoms remain non-negligible in size. This non equivalence
result then motivates us to analyze the asymptotic relationship between
appropriately dened sequences of Cournot-Nash allocations of the strategic
market game and the Walras allocations of the exchange economy. We do
this by introducing a concept of replication which we call a la Cournot, since
it extends to a general equilibrium context the original Cournotian idea of
replication: that is, we partially replicate the economy by increasing only the
number of atoms, this way making them asymptotically negligible, without
aecting the atomless part. At the same time, the mechanism of replication
of atoms is constructed in such a way that the measure space of traders
remains nite. If this requirement was not satised, the general equilibrium
model of oligopoly studied in the paper would not be well-dened. Our
main theorem establishes that any sequence of Cournot-Nash allocations of
the strategic market games associated with the partial replications of the
exchange economy has a limit point for each trader and that the assignment
determined by these limit points is a Walrasian allocation of the original
economy.
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To prove the limit theorem, we use analytical tools introduced by Sahi
and Yao (1989) to show their convergence result for nite economies, and
by Codognato and Ghosal (2000) to show their equivalence theorem a la
Aumann (1964). However, we have to tackle new technical issues due to
the fact that the space of traders has a mixed nature. To this end, we ex-
ploit some tools previously applied to the Shapley window model for mixed
economies by Busetto et al. (2011). In particular, in order to determine
the limit points of the sequences of Cournot-Nash allocations, we use a ver-
sion of the Fatou's lemma in several dimensions proved by Artstein (1979).
Moreover, a key point in our paper is that since the Walrasian price taking
behavior of small traders is not assumed a priori, as in the Cournot-Walras
equilibrium models, but endogenously generated, we do not need to impose
any continuity assumption on the selections from the Walras price corre-
spondence.
The general equilibrium approach adopted here distinguishes our limit
result from the well-known results, obtained within the Cournotian tradition
in partial equilibrium, establishing that the Cournot equilibrium approaches
the competitive equilibrium as the number of oligopolists goes to innity (see
Frank (1965), Run (1971), Novshek (1980), among others).
Our limit result is also dierent from existing results in the strategic mar-
ket game literature: within their Shapley window model for nite economies,
Sahi and Yao (1989) showed the convergence of sequences of Cournot-Nash
allocations to a Walras allocation by using a replication concept a la Edge-
worth, in which all types of agents are replicated (on this kind of replication
see Debreu and Scarf (1963)).
Other limit results were obtained within the line opened by Gabszewicz
and Vial: see Roberts (1980), Mas-Colell (1983), and Novshek and Sonnen-
schein ((1983), (1987)), among others. Also these results are obtained by
using replication concepts in which all types of agents are replicated. More-
over, as stressed by Mas-Colell (1982) (see, in particular, pp. 203-204)), they
depend in an essential way on the assumption that there exists a continuous
selection from the Walras price correspondence.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we build the mathemat-
ical model. In Section 3, we introduce the notion of a -positive Cournot-
Nash equilibrium used in the construction of the limit theorem, and we
state a theorem on its existence (the proof is in the Appendix). In Sec-
tion 4, we provide the example on the non-equivalence between the sets of
Cournot-Nash and Walras allocations when the atoms are countably in-
nite. In Section 5, we introduce the replication a la Cournot. In Section 6,
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we state the existence of a -positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash
equilibrium (the proof is in the Appendix). In Section 7, we state and prove
the limit theorem.
2 The mathematical model
We consider a pure exchange economy, E , with large traders, represented
as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. The space
of traders is denoted by the measure space (T; T ; ), where T is the set of
traders, T is the -algebra of all -measurable subsets of T , and  is a real
valued, non-negative, countably additive measure dened on T . We assume
that (T; T ; ) is nite, i.e., (T ) <1. This implies that the measure space
(T; T ; ) contains at most countably many atoms. Let T1 denote the set of
atoms and T0 = T n T1 the atomless part of T . A null set of traders is a set
of measure 0. Null sets of traders are systematically ignored throughout the
paper. Thus, a statement asserted for \each" trader in a certain set is to
be understood to hold for all such traders except possibly for a null set of
traders. The word \integrable" is to be understood in the sense of Lebesgue.
In the exchange economy, there are l dierent commodities. A com-
modity bundle is a point in Rl+. An assignment (of commodity bundles
to traders) is an integrable function x: T ! Rl+. There is a xed initial
assignment w, satisfying the following assumption.
Assumption 1. w(t) > 0, for each t 2 T .
An allocation is an assignment x for which
R
T x(t) d =
R
T w(t) d.
The preferences of each trader t 2 T are described by a utility function
ut : R
l
+ ! R, satisfying the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. ut : R
l
+ ! R is continuous, strongly monotone, and quasi-
concave, for each t 2 T .
Let B denote the Borel -algebra of Rl+. Moreover, let T
NB denote
the -algebra generated by all the sets E  F such that E 2 T and F 2 B.
Assumption 3. u : T  Rl+ ! R, given by u(t; x) = ut(x), for each t 2 T
and for each x 2 Rl+, is T
NB-measurable.
We also need the following assumption (see Sahi and Yao (1989)).
Assumption 4. There are at least two traders in T1 for whom w(t)  0,
ut is continuously dierentiable in R
l
++, and fx 2 Rl+ : ut(x) = ut(w(t))g 
Rl++.
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A price vector is a nonnull vector p 2 Rl+.
A Walras equilibrium of E is a pair (p;x), consisting of a price vector
p and an allocation x, such that, for each t 2 T , ut(x(t))  ut(y), for all
y 2 fx 2 Rl+ : px = pw(t)g. A Walras allocation of E is an allocation
x for which there exists a price vector p such that the pair (p;x) is a
Walras equilibrium of E .
We dene now the strategic market game,  , associated with E .
Let P(Rl2+) denote the power set of Rl
2
+. A strategy correspondence is a
correspondence B : T ! P(Rl2+) such that, for each t 2 T , B(t) = f(bij) 2
Rl
2
+ :
Pl
j=1 bij  wi(t); i = 1; : : : ; lg, where bij ; i; j = 1; : : : ; l, represents the
amount of commodity i that trader t oers in exchange for commodity j.
Moreover, we denote, with some abuse of notation, by b(t) 2 B(t) a strategy
of trader t. A strategy selection is an integrable function b : T ! Rl2+, such
that, for each t 2 T , b(t) 2 B(t). Given a strategy selection b, we call
aggregate matrix the matrix B such that bij = (
R
T bij(t) d), i; j = 1; : : : ; l.
Moreover, we denote by b n b(t) the strategy selection obtained from b by
replacing b(t) with b(t) 2 B(t) and by B n b(t) the corresponding aggregate
matrix.
Then, we introduce two further denitions (see Sahi and Yao (1989)).
Denition 1. A nonnegative square matrix A is said to be irreducible if, for
every pair (i; j), with i 6= j, there is a positive integer k such that a(k)ij > 0,
where a
(k)
ij denotes the ij-th entry of the k-th power A
k of A.
Denition 2. Given a strategy selection b, a price vector p is said to be
market clearing if
p 2 Rl++;
lX
i=1
pibij = p
j(
lX
i=1
bji); j = 1; : : : ; l: (1)
By Lemma 1 in Sahi and Yao (1989), there is a unique, up to a scalar
multiple, price vector p satisfying (1) if and only if B is irreducible. Then,
we denote by p(b) a function which associates with each strategy selection
b the unique, up to a scalar multiple, price vector p satisfying (1), if B is
irreducible, and is equal to 0, otherwise.
Given a strategy selection b and a price vector p, consider the assignment
determined as follows:
xj(t;b(t); p) = wj(t) 
lX
i=1
bji(t) +
lX
i=1
bij(t)
pi
pj
; if p 2 Rl++;
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xj(t;b(t); p) = wj(t); otherwise;
j = 1; : : : ; l, for each t 2 T .
Given a strategy selection b and the function p(b), the traders' nal
holdings are determined according to this rule and consequently expressed
by the assignment
x(t) = x(t;b(t); p(b));
for each t 2 T .1 It is straightforward to show that this assignment is an
allocation satisfying p(b)x(t;b(t); p(b)) = p(b)w(t), for each t 2 T .
We are now able to dene a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of   (see Codog-
nato and Ghosal (2000) and Busetto et al. (2011)).
Denition 3. A strategy selection b^ such that
^
B is irreducible is a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium of   if
ut(x(t; b^(t); p(b^)))  ut(x(t; b(t); p(b^ n b(t))));
for each b(t) 2 B(t) and for each t 2 T .2
A Cournot-Nash allocation of   is an allocation x^ such that x^(t) =
x(t; b^(t); p(b^)), for each t 2 T , where b^ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  .
3 The existence of a -positive Cournot-Nash equi-
librium of  
In this section, we dene the notion of a -positive Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium, which was rst used by Sahi and Yao (1989) to prove their existence
theorem for the nite version of the Shapley model and their limit result.
We will use it, in this paper, for analogous purposes.
Let T1  T1 be a set consisting of two traders in T1 for whom Assumption
4 holds. Moreover, let  = mint2 T1f1l minfw1(t); : : : ;wl(t)gg. We say that
the correspondence B : T ! P(Rl2+) is a -positive strategy correspondence
if B(t) = B(t) \ f(bij) 2 Rl2+ :
P
i 62J
P
j2J(bij + bji)  ; for each J 
f1; : : : ; lgg, for each t 2 T1 and if B(t) = B(t), for the remaining traders
1In order to save in notation, with some abuse, we denote by x both the function x(t)
and the function x(t;b(t); p(b)).
2Let us notice that, as this denition of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium explicitly refers
to irreducible matrices, it applies only to active equilibria of   (on this point, see Sahi and
Yao (1989)).
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t 2 T . Moreover, we say that a strategy selection b is -positive if b(t) 2
B(t), for each t 2 T . Finally, we say that a Cournot-Nash equilibrium b^ of
  is -positive if b^ is a -positive strategy selection.
The following theorem shows the existence of a -positive Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of  . It is a straightforward consequence of the existence theo-
rem in Busetto et al. (2011).
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, there exists a -positive
Cournot-Nash equilibrium b^ of  .
Proof. See the Appendix.
4 An example
Sahi and Yao (1989) formalized the Shapley window model in the context
of an exchange economy with a nite set of traders. Codognato and Ghosal
(2000) reconsidered the Sahi and Yao's model within an exchange economy
with an atomless continuum of traders. In this framework, they showed an
equivalence result a la Aumann (1964) between the set of the Cournot-Nash
allocations of the window model and the set of the Walras allocations of the
underlying exchange economy. The mixed measure space we are considering
here may contain countably innite atoms. This raises the question whether
an equivalence result can be obtained also in this case. The following exam-
ple provides a negative answer to this question.
Consider an exchange economy E where l = 2, which satises Assump-
tions 1, 2, 3, and 4. Moreover, assume that T1 contains countably in-
nite atoms and that there is an atom  2 T1 such that w1() = 0,
w2() > 0, u (x) =
P2
i=1 v
i
 (x
i), for each x 2 R2+, vi (xi) is dierentiable,
and dv
i
 (0)
dxi
= +1, i = 1; 2.3 Suppose that b^ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
of   and that the allocation x^(t) = x(t; b^(t); p(b^)), for each t 2 T , is a
Walras allocation of E . Then, there is a price vector p^ such that the pair
(p^; x^) is a Walras equilibrium of E . We have that p^ 0 as ut() is strongly
monotone, for each t 2 T , and x^() 0 as dvi (0)
dxi
= +1, i = 1; 2. Then, we
have that
p^1
p^2
=
w2()  x2()
x1()
=
p1(b^)
p2(b^)
; (2)
3For instance, the utility function u(x) =
p
x1 +
p
x2 satises these conditions.
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as p^x^() = p^w() and p(b^)x^() = p(b^)w(). Moreover, we have that
0 < b^21() < w
2() as x^() 0, and b^12() = 0 as w1() = 0. Since
p1(b^ n b()) = 
Z
Tn
b^21(t) d+ b21()() = (
^
b21 n b21());
and
p2(b^ n b()) = 
Z
Tn
b^12(t) d+ b12()() = 
Z
Tn
b^12(t) d = 
^
b12;
with  > 0, by (1) and Lemma 2 in Sahi and Yao (1989), trader  's nal
holding, given the Cournot-Nash equilibrium strategies of the other traders,
is
x(; b(); p(b^ n b())) = (b21()
^
b12
^
b21 n b21()
;w2()  b21()):
Then, trader  's payo as a function of his own strategy, given the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium strategies of the other traders, is
u (x^(; b(); p(b^ n b()))) = v1 (b21()
^
b12
^
b21 n b21()
) + v2 (w
2()  b21()):
The derivative of this function with respect to trader  's strategy is
@u (x^(; b(); p(b^ n b())))
@b21()
=
@v1 (x^(; b(); p(b^ n b())))
@x1

^
b21 n b21()  b21()()
^
b21 n b21()
^
b12
^
b21 n b21()
  @v
2
 (x^(; b(); p(b^ n b())))
@x2
=
@v1 (x^(; b(); p(b^ n b())))
@x1

^
b21 n b21()  b21()()
^
b21 n b21()
p2(b^ n b())
p1(b^ n b())
 @v
2
 (x^(; b(); p(b^ n b())))
@x2
:
Computing this derivative at b() = b^(), we obtain
@v1 (x^())
@x1
^
b21   b^21()()
^
b21
p2(b^)
p1(b^)
  @v
2
 (x^())
@x2
= 0;
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as b^() = argmaxfu (x(; b(); p(b n b()))) : b() 2 B()g and 0 <
b^21() < w
2(). Consequently, we have
@v1 (x^())
@x1
@v2 (x^())
@x2
=
^
b21
^
b21   b^21()()
p^1
p^2
=
p^1
p^2
as p^
1
p^2
= p
1(b^)
p2(b^)
by (2) and the pair (p^; x^) is a Walras equilibrium of E . But
then, we must have that b^21() = 0, a contradiction. Hence, x^ is not a
Walras allocation of E .
This shows that the condition that E contains a countably innite num-
ber of atoms is not sucient to guarantee that any Cournot-Nash allocation
of   is a Walras allocation of E .
5 The replication a la Cournot of E
The negative result obtained in the previous section leads us to deal with
the question whether a limit result can be instead obtained by replicating
the exchange economy E .
We address this question by introducing a concept of replication in the
original spirit of Cournot (1838). By analogy with the replication proposed
by Cournot in a partial equilibrium framework, the concept we propose is
obtained in fact by replicating only the atoms of E , while making them
asymptotically negligible, and without aecting the atomless part.
This partial replication a la Cournot of E can be formalized as follows.
Let En be an exchange economy characterized as in Section 2, where each
atom is replicated n times. For each t 2 T1, let tr denote the r-th element of
the n-fold replication of t. We assume that, for each t 2 T1, w(tr) = w(ts) =
w(t), utr() = uts() = ut(), r; s = 1; : : : ; n, and (tr) = (t)n , r = 1; : : : ; n.
Clearly, E1coincides with E .
Then, the strategic market game  n associated with En can be character-
ized, mutatis mutandis, as in Section 2. Clearly,  1 coincides with  . A strat-
egy selection b of  n is said to be atom-type-symmetric if bn(tr) = bn(ts),
r; s = 1; : : : ; n, for each t 2 T1.
We provide now the denition of an atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash
equilibrium of  n.
Denition 4. A strategy selection b^ such that
^
B is irreducible is an atom-
type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  n if b^ is atom-type-symmetric
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and if
utr(x(tr; b^(tr); p(b^)))  utr(x(tr; b(tr); p(b^ n b(tr))));
for each b(tr) 2 B(tr), r = 1; : : : ; n, and for each t 2 T1;
ut(x(t; b^(t); p(b^)))  ut(x(t; b(t); p(b^ n b(t))));
for each b(t) 2 B(t) and for each t 2 T0.
6 The existence of a -positive atom-type-symme-
tric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  n
In this section, we introduce the notion of a -positive atom-type-symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  n. Moreover, we state and prove that an
equilibrium of this kind exists under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4. This result
is needed to show our limit theorem by using the replication a la Cournot
introduced in Section 5.
Let  be determined as in Section 3. Also a -positive strategy corre-
spondence, B, is dened, mutatis mutandis, as in Section 3. Notice that
B(tr) = B(ts), r; s = 1; : : : ; n, for each t 2 T1. We say that a strategy
selection b is -positive if b(tr) 2 B(tr), r = 1; : : : ; n, for each t 2 T1, and
b(t) 2 B(t), for each t 2 T0. Then, we say that an atom-type-symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium b^ of  n is -positive if b^ is a -positive strategy
selection.
The following theorem establishes the existence of a -positive atom-
type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  n. The proof of the theorem
adapts to our context tools and arguments developed by Sahi and Yao (1989)
and Busetto et al. (2011) to show the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium of the Shapley window model, respectively in the case of a nite set of
traders and in the case of a mixed measure space of traders a la Shitovitz.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, there exists a -positive
atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium b^ of  n.
Proof. See the Appendix.
7 The limit theorem
In this section, we state and prove the limit theorem. It establishes that,
given a sequence of atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash allocations of  n,
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for n = 1; 2; : : :, there exists a Walras allocation of E with this property:
for each trader t 2 T , the value of this Walras allocation at t is a limit
point of the sequence of nal holdings of t associated with the sequence of
atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibria of  n, for n = 1; 2; : : :.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, let fb^ng be a sequence
of strategy selections of   and let fp^ng be a sequence of prices such that
b^n(t) = b^ 
n
(tr), r = 1; : : : ; n, for each t 2 T1, b^n(t) = b^ n(t), for each
t 2 T0, and p^n = p(b^ n), where b^ n is a -positive atom-type-symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  n, for n = 1; 2; : : :. Then,
(i) there exists a subsequence fb^kng of the sequence fb^ng, a subsequence
fp^kng of the sequence fp^ng, a strategy selection b^ of  , and a price vector
p^, with p^ 0, such that b^(t) is the limit of the sequence fb^kn(t)g, for each
t 2 T1, b^(t) is a limit point of the sequence fb^kn(t)g, for each t 2 T0, the
sequence f ^Bkng converges to ^B, and the sequence fp^kng converges to p^;
(ii) x^(t) is the limit of the sequence fx^kn(t)g, for each t 2 T1, and x^(t)
is a limit point of the sequence fx^kn(t)g, for each t 2 T0, where x^(t) =
x(t; b^(t); p^) for each t 2 T , x^kn(t) = x(t; b^kn(t); p^kn), for each t 2 T , and for
n = 1; 2; : : :;
(iii) the pair (p^; x^) is a Walras equilibrium of E .
Proof. (i) Let fb^ng be a sequence of strategy selections of   and let fp^ng
be a sequence of prices such that b^n(t) = b^ 
n
(tr), r = 1; : : : ; n, for each
t 2 T1, b^n(t) = b^ n(t), for each t 2 T0, and p^n = p(b^ n), where b^ n
is a -positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  n, for
n = 1; 2; : : :. The facts that the sequence f ^Bng belongs to the compact
set f(bij) 2 Rl2+ : bij 
R
T w
i(t) d; i; j = 1; : : : ; l;
P
i 62J
P
j2J(bij + bji) R
T1
 d; for each J  f1; : : : ; lgg, the sequence fb^n(t)g belongs to the com-
pact set B(t), for each t 2 T1, and the sequence fp^ng, belongs, by Lemma 9
in Sahi and Yao, to a compact set P , imply that there is a subsequence
f ^Bkng of the sequence f ^Bng which converges to an element of the set
f(bij) 2 Rl2+ : bij 
R
T w
i(t) d; i; j = 1; : : : ; l;
P
i62J
P
j2J(bij + bji) R
T1
 d; for each J  f1; : : : ; lgg, a subsequence fb^kn(t)g of the sequence
fb^n(t)g which converges to an element of the set B(t), for each t 2 T1, and
a subsequence fp^kng of the sequence fp^ng which converges to an element p^
of the set P . Moreover, by Lemma 9 in Sahi and Yao, p^  0. Since the
sequence fb^kng satises the assumptions of Theorem A in Artstein (1979),
there is a function b^ such that b^(t) is the limit of the sequence fb^kn(t)g, for
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each t 2 T1, b^(t) is a limit point of the sequence fb^kn(t)g, for each t 2 T0,
and such that the sequence f ^Bkng converges to ^B.
(ii) Let x^(t) = x(t; b^(t); p^) for each t 2 T , x^kn(t) = x(t; b^kn(t); p^kn), for each
t 2 T , and for n = 1; 2; : : :. Then, x^(t) is the limit of the sequence fx^kn(t)g,
for each t 2 T1, as b^(t) is the limit of the sequence fb^kn(t)g, for each t 2 T1,
and the sequence fp^kng converges to p^, x^(t) is a limit point of the sequence
fx^kn(t)g, for each t 2 T0, as b^(t) is a limit point of the sequence fb^kn(t)g,
for each t 2 T0, and the sequence fp^kng converges to p^.
(iii)
^
B
 n
=
^
B
n
as
^
b
 n
ij =
P
t2T1
Pn
r=1 b^
 n
ij (tr)(tr) +
R
t2T0 b^
 n
ij (t) d =P
t2T1 nb^
n
ij(t)
(t)
n +
R
t2T0 b^
n
ij(t) d =
P
t2T1 b^
n
ij(t)(t)+
R
t2T0 b^
n
ij(t) d =
^
b
n
ij ,
i; j = 1; : : : ; l, for n = 1; 2; : : :. Then, p^n = p(b^n) as p^n and b^n satisfy (1), for
n = 1; 2; : : :. But then, by continuity, p^ and b^ must satisfy (1). Therefore,
Lemma 1 in Sahi and Yao implies that
^
B is completely reducible. More-
over, b^(t) 2 B(t) since b^(t) is a limit point of the sequence fb^kn(t)g, for
all t 2 T . Then, b^ is -positive. But then, by Remark 3 in Sahi and Yao,
^
B must be irreducible. Consider the pair (p^; x^). It is straightforward to
show that the assignment x^ is an allocation as p^ and b^ satisfy (1) and that
x^(t) 2 fx 2 Rl+ : p^x = p^w(t)g, for all t 2 T . Suppose that (p^; x^) is not a
Walras equilibrium of E . Then, there exists a trader  2 T and a commodity
bundle ~x 2 fx 2 Rl+ : p^x = p^w()g such that u (~x) > u (x^()). By Lemma
5 in Codognato and Ghosal (2000), there exist ~j  0, Plj=1 ~j = 1, such
that
~xj = ~j
Pl
i=1 p^
iwi()
p^j
; j = 1; : : : ; l:
Let ~bij = w
i()~j , i; j = 1; : : : ; l. Then, it is straightforward to verify that
~xj = wj() 
lX
i=1
~bji +
lX
i=1
~bij
p^i
p^j
;
for each j = 1; : : : ; l. Consider the following cases.
Case 1.  2 T1. Let fhng denote a sequence such that hn = kn, if k1 > 1,
hn = kn+1, otherwise, for n = 1; 2; : : :. Let  denote the k1-th element of
the n-fold replication of E and let ^B 
hn
n~b() be the aggregate matrix cor-
responding to the strategy selection b^ 
hn n ~b(), where ~b() = ~b, for n =
1; 2; : : :. Let 
^
B
 hn
, 
^
B
 hn n~b(), and  ^Bhn denote the diagonal matrices
of row sums of, respectively,
^
B
 hn
,
^
B
 hn n ~b(), and ^Bhn , for n = 1; 2; : : :.
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Moreover, let q 
hn
, q 
hn
 , and q
hn denote the vectors of the cofactors of the
rst column of, respectively, 
^
B
 hn   ^B 
hn
, 
^
B
 hn n ~b()  ^B 
hn
n ~b(),
and 
^
B
hn   ^Bhn , for n = 1; 2; : : :. Clearly, q hn = qhn as ^B 
hn
=
^
B
hn
,
for n = 1; 2; : : :. Let 
^
B be the diagonal matrix of row sums of
^
B and q
be the cofactors of the rst column of 
^
B  ^B. The sequences fq hng and
fqhng converge to q as the sequence ^Bhn converges to ^B and q hn = qhn , for
n = 1; 2; : : :. Let w = maxfw1(); : : : ;wl()g. Consider the matrix ^B 
hn
 
^
B
 hn n ~b(), for n = 1; 2; : : :. Then, ^b 
hn
ij   ^b
 hn
ij n ~bij() = ( 1n b^ 
hn
ij () 
1
n
~bij()), i; j = 1; : : : ; l, for n = 1; 2; : : :. But then, the sequence of Eu-
clidean distances fk ^B 
hn
  ^B 
hn
n ~b()kg converges to 0 as j 1n b^ 
hn
ij ()  
1
n
~bij()j= 1n jb^ 
hn
ij ()  ~bij()j  1n w, i; j = 1; : : : ; l, n = 1; 2; : : :. The se-
quence f ^B 
hn
n~b()g converges to ^B as, by the triangle inequality, k ^B 
hn
n
~b()g  ^Bk  k ^B 
hn
  ^B 
hn
n~b()k+k ^B 
hn
  ^Bk = k ^B 
hn
  ^B 
hn
n~b()k+
k ^Bhn   ^Bk, for n = 1; 2; : : :, and the sequences fk ^B 
hn
  ^B 
hn
n ~b()kg
and fk ^Bhn   ^Bkg converge to 0. Then, the sequence fq hn g converges to q.
u(x(; b^
 hn (); p(b^ 
hn
)))  u(x(;~b(); p(b^ hn n ~b()))) as b^ hn
is a -positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  hn , for
n = 1; 2; : : :. Let b^hn n ~b() be a strategy selection obtained by replac-
ing b^hn() in b^hn with ~b, for n = 1; 2; : : :. Then, u (x(; b^
hn(); q 
hn
)) 
u (x(;~b(); q
 hn
 )) as b^
 hn () = b^hn(), p(b^ 
hn
) = hnq
 hn , with hn >
0, by Lemma 2 in Sahi and Yao, b^ 
hn n ~b() = b^hn n ~b(), and p(b^ hn n
~b()) = hnq
 hn
 , with hn > 0, by Lemma 2 in Sahi and Yao, for n =
1; 2; : : :. But then, u (x^())  u (~x), by Assumption 2, as the sequence
fb^hn()g converges to b^(), the sequence fq hng converges to q, the se-
quence fq hn g converges to q, and p^ = q, with  > 0, by Lemma 2 in Sahi
and Yao, a contradiction.
Case 2.  2 T0. Let fb^hkn ()g be a subsequence of the sequence fb^kn()g
which converges to b^(). Moreover, let b^ 
hkn n ~b() be a strategy se-
lection obtained by replacing b^hkn () in b^ 
hkn with ~b, for n = 1; 2; : : :.
u (x(; b^
 hkn (); p(b^ 
hkn )))  u (x(;~b(); p(b^ 
hkn n ~b()))) as b^ hkn is
a -positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  hkn , for
n = 1; 2; : : :. Let b^hkn n ~b() be a strategy selection obtained by replacing
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b^hkn () in b^hkn with ~b, for n = 1; 2; : : :. Then, u (x(; b^
hkn (); p^hkn )) 
u (x(;~b(); p^
hkn )) as b^ 
hkn () = b^hkn (), p(b^ 
hkn ) = p^hkn , b^ 
hkn n ~b() =
b^hkn n~b(), and p(b^ hkn n~b()) = p^hkn . But then, u (x^())  u (~x), by As-
sumption 2, as the sequence fb^hkn ()g converges to b^() and the sequence
fphkng converges to p^, a contradiction.
Hence, the pair (p^; x^) is a Walras equilibrium of E .
8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Busetto et al. (2011) showed that, under Assump-
tions 1, 2, 3, and 4, there exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  , b^, such
that, for each t 2 T , b^(t) 2 B(t). This implies that b^ is a -positive
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  .
Proof of Theorem 2. Let us introduce a slightly perturbed version of the
game  n, denoted by  n(). Given  > 0 and a strategy selection b, we
dene the aggregate matrix B to be the matrix such that bij = (bij + ),
i; j = 1; : : : ; l. Clearly, the matrix B is irreducible. The interpretation is
that an outside agency places xed bids of  for each pair of commodities
(i; j). Given  > 0, we denote by p(b) the function which associates, with
each strategy selection b, the unique, up to a scalar multiple, price vector
which satises
lX
i=1
pi(bij + ) = p
j(
lX
i=1
bji + )); j = 1; : : : ; l:
Then, let us introduce the following notion of equilibrium for  n().
Denition 5. Given  > 0, a strategy selection b^ is an atom-type-symmetric
-Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  n() if b^ is atom-type-symmetric and
utr(x(tr; b^
(tr); p(b^)))  utr(tr; b(tr); p(b^ n b(tr))));
for each b(tr) 2 B(tr), r = 1; : : : ; n, and for each t 2 T1;
ut(x(t; b^
(t); p(b^)))  ut(t; b(t); p(b^ n b(t))));
for each b(t) 2 B(t) and for each t 2 T0.
Moreover, we say that an atom-type-symmetric -Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium b^ of  n() is -positive if b^ is a -positive strategy selection.
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To show Theorem 2, we rst need to prove the existence of a -positive
atom-type-symmetric -Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  n(). To do so, we
apply, as in Busetto et al. (2011), the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem
(see Theorem 17.55 in Aliprantis and Border (2006), p. 583).
We neglect, as usual, the distinction between integrable functions and
equivalence classes of such functions and denote by L1(;R
l2) the set of
integrable functions taking values in Rl
2
, by L1(;B()) the set of strategy
selections, and by L1(;B
()) the set of atom-type-symmetric strategy se-
lections. Note that the locally convex Hausdor space we shall be working
in is L1(;R
l2), endowed with its weak topology.
The proof of existence of a -positive atom-type-symmetric -Cournot-
Nash equilibrium of  n() is articulated in three lemmas.
The rst lemma establishes the properties of L1(;B
()) required to
apply the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem.
Lemma 1. The set L1(;B
()) is nonempty, convex and weakly compact.
Proof. L1(;B
()) is nonempty, convex and it has a weakly compact clo-
sure by the same argument used by Busetto et al. (2011) to prove their
Lemma 1. Now, let fbmg be a convergent sequence of L1(;B()). Since
L1(;R
l2) is complete, fbmg converges in the mean to an integrable func-
tion b. But then, there exists a subsequence fbkmg of fbmg such that
bkm(tr) converges to b(tr), r = 1; : : : ; n, for each t 2 T1, and bkm(t) con-
verges to b(t), for each t 2 T0 (see Theorem 25.5 in Aliprantis and Burkin-
shaw (1998), p. 203). The compactness of B(t), for each t 2 T , and the
fact that bkm(tr) = bkm(ts), r; s = 1; : : : ; n, for each t 2 T1, implies that
b 2 L1(;B()). Hence L1(;B()) is norm closed and, since it is also
convex, it is weakly closed (see Corollary 4 in Diestel (1984), p. 12).
Now, given  > 0, let tr : L1(;B
()) ! B(tr) be a correspondence
such that tr(b) = argmaxfutr(x(t; b(tr); p(bnb(tr)))) : b(tr) 2 B(tr)g, r =
1; : : : ; n, for each t 2 T1, and let t : L1(;B())! B(t) be a correspondence
such that t(b) = argmaxfut(x(t; b(t); p(b n b(t)))) : b(t) 2 B(t)g, for each
t 2 T0. Let  : L1(;B()) ! L1(;B()) be a correspondence such
that (b) = fb 2 L1(;B()) : b(tr) 2 tr(b); r = 1; : : : ; n; for each t 2
T1; and b(t) 2 t(b); for each t 2 T0g.
The second lemma provides us with the properties of the correspondence
. The proof is obtained by readapting to our context the arguments used
to show Lemma 2 in Busetto et al. (2011), and we omit it here.
Lemma 2. Given  > 0, the correspondence  : L1(;B
())! L1(;B())
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is such that the set (b) is nonempty and convex, for all b 2 L1(;B()),
and it has a weakly closed graph.
Now, given  > 0, let tr : L1(;B
()) ! B(tr) be a correspon-
dence such that tr(b) = 

tr(b) \ B(tr), r = 1; : : : ; n, for each t 2 T1,
and let t : L1(;B()) ! B(t) be a correspondence such that t (b) =
t(b) \ B(t), for each t 2 T0. Let  : L1(;B()) ! L1(;B()) be a
correspondence such that (b) = fb 2 L1(;B()) : b(tr) 2 tr(b); r =
1; : : : ; n; for each t 2 T1; and b(t) 2 t (b); for each t 2 T0g. Moreover,
let  : L1(;B())! L1(;B()) be a correspondence such that (b)
= (b) \ L1(;B()).
We are ready to prove the existence of a -positive atom-type-symmetric
-Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  n().
Lemma 3. Given  > 0, there exists a -positive atom-type-symmetric
-Cournot-Nash equilibrium b^ of  n().
Proof. Let  > 0 be given. By Lemma 6 in Sahi and Yao (1989), we know
that, for each b 2 L1(;B()), tr(b) is nonempty, r = 1; : : : ; n, for each
t 2 T1. Moreover, for each b 2 L1(;B()) and for each t 2 T1, there
exists ~b 2 B(t) such that ~b 2 tr(b), r = 1; : : : ; n as b is an atom-type-
symmetric strategy prole. But then, by the same argument of Lemma 2 in
Busetto et al. (2011), (b) is nonempty. The convexity of (b), for each
b 2 L1(;B()), is a straightforward consequence of the convexity of tr(b)
and B(t), r = 1; : : : ; n, for each t 2 T1, and of t(b) and B(t), for each
t 2 T0. But then,  is convex valued as L1(;B()) is convex. tr is upper
hemicontinuous and compact valued, r = 1; : : : ; n, for each t 2 T1, as it is the
intersection of the correspondence tr, which is upper hemicontinuous and
compact valued by Lemma 2 in Busetto et al. (2011), and the continuous
and compact valued correspondence which assigns to each strategy selection
b 2 L1(;B()) the strategy set B(tr) (see Theorem 17.25 in Aliprantis
and Border (2006), p. 567). Moreover, t is upper hemicontinuous and
compact valued, for each t 2 T0, using the same argument. Therefore,
 has a weakly closed graph, by the same argument used in the proof of
Lemma 2. Finally,  has a weakly closed graph as it is the intersection of
the correspondence  and the continuous correspondence which assigns to
each strategy selection b 2 L1(;B()) the weakly closed set L1(;B())
which, by the Closed Graph Theorem (see Theorem 17.11 in Aliprantis and
Border (2006), p. 561), has a weakly closed graph (see Theorem 17.25 in
Aliprantis and Border (2006), p. 567). But then, by the Kakutani-Fan-
Glicksberg Theorem (see Theorem 17.55 in Aliprantis and Border (2006), p.
17
583), there exists a xed point b^ of the correspondence  and hence a
-positive atom-type-symmetric -Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  n().
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, we have to show that there exists
the limit of a sequence of -positive atom-type-symmetric -Cournot-Nash
equilibria and that this limit is a -positive atom-type-symmetric -Cournot-
Nash equilibrium of  n. Following Busetto et al. (2011), in this part of the
proof we essentially refer to Lemma 9 in Sahi and Yao (1989) and a gener-
alization of the Fatou's lemma in several dimensions provided by Artstein
(1979).
Then, let m =
1
m ; m = 1; 2; : : :. By Lemma 3, for each m = 1; 2; : : :,
there is a -positive atom-type-symmetric -Cournot-Nash equilibrium b^m .
The facts that the sequence f ^Bmg belongs to the compact set f(bij) 2 Rl2+ :
bij  n
R
T1
wi(t) d +
R
T0
wi(t) d; i; j = 1; : : : ; l;
P
i62J
P
j2J(bij + bji) 
n
R
T1
 d; for each J  f1; : : : ; lgg, the sequence fb^m(tr)g belongs to the
compact set B(tr), r = 1; : : : ; n, for each t 2 T1, and the sequence fp^mg,
where p^m = pm(b^m), for each m = 1; 2; : : :, belongs, by Lemma 9 in Sahi
and Yao (1989), to a compact set P, imply that there is a subsequence f ^Bkmg
of the sequence f ^Bmg which converges to an element of the set f(bij) 2
Rl
2
+ : bij  n
R
T1
wi(t) d +
R
T0
wi(t) d; i; j = 1; : : : ; l;
P
i 62J
P
j2J(bij +
bji)  n
R
T1
 d; for each J  f1; : : : ; lgg, a subsequence fb^km (tr)g of the
sequence fb^m(tr)g which converges to an element of the set B(tr), r =
1; : : : ; n, for each t 2 T1, and a subsequence fp^kmg of the sequence fp^mg
which converges to an element of the set P . Since the sequence fb^kmg
satises the assumptions of Theorem A in Artstein (1979), there is a function
b^ such that b^(tr) is the limit of the sequence fb^km (tr)g, r = 1; : : : ; n, for
each t 2 T1, b^(t) is a limit point of the sequence fb^km (t)g, for each t 2 T0,
and such that the sequence f ^Bkmg converges to ^B. Then, b^(tr) = b^(ts)
as fb^km (tr)g = fb^km (ts)g, r; s = 1; : : : ; n, for each t 2 T1, and b^(tr) is
the limit of the sequence fb^km (tr)g, r = 1; : : : ; n, for each t 2 T1. Hence,
it can be proved, by the same argument used by Busetto et al. (2011) to
show their existence theorem, that b^ is an atom-type-symmetric -positive
Cournot-Nash equilibrium of  n().
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